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Abstract 
Employers are increasingly using wellness incentives, including penalties for unhealthy behavior. Survey 
data suggests that people are willing to accept the principle of penalizing those perceived to take health 
risks, but the equally relevant question of the magnitude of acceptable penalties is unclear. 
While the principle of penalizing overweight and obese people has some support, findings from a 
population-level experiment (n=1,000) suggest that the acceptable size of penalties is comparatively 
small, around $50: more than 10-fold below levels favored by advocates. Reward-based incentives are 
favored over penalty-based ones by a factor of 4. Of two different ways of framing penalty programs, 
poorer and higher weight groups appear to find the one that is more overtly penalizing less acceptable. 
Levels of incentives matter on effectiveness as well as on ethical grounds, as it cannot be assumed that it 
is equally easy for all to meet health targets to secure a benefit or avoid a penalty. Programs should be 
designed to engage, not to frustrate those most in need of health improvement. Employee involvement in 
determining incentive types and levels, and explicit justification for program design can help both 
employees and employers to reap benefits. 
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Introduction 
 
Financial incentives may be useful tools for health promotion and cost control. 
Over recent years, employers’ use of wellness incentives has increased 
substantially, and 2010 legal reforms introduced considerably higher levels for 
both reward and penalty-based incentives.  Survey research suggests some 
support for the principle of penalizing people who are perceived to be taking 
health risks 1 , 2 . However, little is known about the magnitude of acceptable 
penalties and rewards among the public. The levels of incentives matter on 
effectiveness as well as fairness grounds, as it cannot be assumed that it is equally 
easy for all to meet targets to secure rewards or avoid penalties.3 A population-
level online survey experiment was fielded to 1,000 US residents to explore 
acceptable levels of incentives and framing effects. Drawing on a typical 
employer-offered weight control program, reward-based incentives were favored 
over penalty-based ones by a factor of 4.  The magnitude of acceptable penalty 
was around $50, 14 times lower than advocated by leading proponents.4 Penalty-
levels in the target population were lower still. Of two different ways of framing 
penalty programs, poorer and higher weight groups appear to find the one that is 
more overtly penalizing less acceptable. 
Section 2705 of the Affordable Care Act has increased the permissible 
levels for wellness incentives tied to health outcomes.  While previously an 
amount of 20% of the cost of coverage was permissible to be used as incentives, 
from 2014, 30-50% may be put at stake. According to a recent survey, employer 
use has more than doubled since 2009: then, 36% of large employers used 
wellness incentives, and around 80% are expected to so in 2012. The use of 
penalties saw a more than four-fold increase over this period: 8% in 2009, and 
38% in 2012. 5  These developments make an exploration of consumers’ 
perspectives urgent.    
 
                                                        
1 Thomson Reuters/NPR 2011 Health Poll: paying for unhealthy behaviours. Available at:  
http://healthcare.thomsonreuters.com/npr/assets/NPR_report_UnhealthyBehav.pdf  (accessed 11 
Dec 2012). 
2 Gollust, S., and J. Lynch. 2011. Who Deserves Health Care? The Effects of Causal Attributions 
and Group Cues on Public Attitudes about Responsibility for Health Care Costs. J Health Polit 
Policy Law, 2011 Dec;36(6):1061-95. 
3 Schmidt, H. 2012. Wellness incentives and the five groups problem. Am J Public Health, January 
2012 Vol. 102, No. 1, pp. 49-54. 
4 Burd, S. 2009. Healthcare solutions that work. Presentation given at Academy Health’s National 
Health Policy Conference, Feb 2 2009, slides available at: 
http://www.academyhealth.org/files/nhpc/2009/Burd.pdf (accessed 11 Dec 2012). 
5 National Business Group on Health, Towers Watson.  2011/2012 Staying@Work Report.  New 
York: Towers Watson; 2011, available at: http://www.towerswatson.com/assets/pdf/6031/Towers-
Watson-Staying-at-Work-Report.pdf (accessed 11 Dec 2012). 
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Methods 
 
In this pilot study, an experiment as part of an attitudinal 14-item cross-sectional 
online-survey was fielded to working-age US residents (20-65 years) via the 
platform SurveyMonkey for 10 days in September/October 2011. Respondents 
were members of a large opt-in ‘river-sampled’ market research panel managed 
by USamp.  Census-adjusted quota sampling by income was performed (12 
income levels in roughly $10,000 intervals), and the survey was stopped when 
n=1,000 responses were received. 
USamp panelists received a generic email with an invitation to a health-
related survey and a link to the study-website, which provided more detailed 
information about aims, content and duration. Nine percent of those who received 
the generic Usamp invitation completed the survey, a typical response rate for this 
kind of panel.  Of those who started the survey, 97% completed it. The sample’s 
mean age was 40 years (SD=13), and gender proportions were 50% male/female. 
The mean difference regarding income, insurance status, health and body mass 
index (BMI) levels in comparison with census data was 5.2% (see also Fig. 1). 
Data were examined using one-way non-parametric analysis (Wilcoxon/Kruskal-
Wallis test). Co-variates included age, gender, income, health, BMI. 
 
Results 
 
The experiment entailed 3 scenarios with different incentive structures that were 
presented in randomized order. The scenario stem was that an employer offers 
employees the opportunity to be weighed at 6-month intervals: 
• In the “carrot” (i.e.: net-reduction) scenario, employees with normal BMI 
on 2 consecutive weigh-ins receive an insurance premium rebate.  
• In the “stick” (i.e: net-increase) scenario, employees who fail to meet the 
normal BMI target face a surcharge.  
• To test framing effects, the third scenario was a “false-carrot” format: 
insurance contributions are increased for all employees at the beginning of 
the plan year by a certain amount, and the increase is reimbursed if the 
target is met. This framing might be perceived as a reduction, but - just as 
in the “stick” scenario -  results in a surcharge for not meeting standards.  
In all 3 scenarios respondents were asked to determine appropriate levels by 
entering amounts between $0 (to indicate disagreement) and $2500 (the cap 
representing the approximate maximum amount in 2014, based on the average 
cost of coverage).  
Fig 1 shows means and medians for all amounts including $0, and for 
amounts larger than $1.  Due to the non-normal distribution, the median of all 
amounts is the most appropriate as a measure of general approval, i.e. $200 for 
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“carrot”, and $50 for both “stick” and “false carrot” (interquartile range: “carrot”: 
$51-458; both remaining: $0-$200). While none of the scenarios had more than 
n=16 missing responses, around 40% of respondents entered $0 in the penalty-
based scenarios, indicating twice higher levels of disapproval (18% entered $0 for 
“carrot”, 37% for “stick” and 42% for “false carrot”).  Conversely, around 60% 
agreed with some kind of penalty for those not meeting BMI targets.   
 
 
 
Key characteristics of the sample in comparison with the US population 
 US (%) Sample (%) 
Income    
High (>200% of median gross household income [HHI]) 20 16 
Middle (60–200% HHI) 49 56 
Low (<60% HHI) 31 28 
Weight   
Normal (BMI 18.5-25) 32 39 
Overweight (BMI 25-30) 33 33 
Obese (BMI >30) 34 25 
Health   
Excellent/very good 44 45 
Good 42 39 
Fair/poor 14 16 
Sources for US data: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 2011. Behavioral Risk Factor 
Surveillance System; United States Census Bureau. 2011. Income, Poverty, and Health 
Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2010. 
 
Subgroup analysis revealed significant differences across age, income, health and 
BMI groups, although not for gender. Fig. 2 shows that higher weight respondents 
generally set lower levels in all scenarios, except for “carrot”, where both the 
overweight and obese opted for $150 and those with normal weight for $200.  
While the median of the normal weight group for “stick” and “false carrot” was 
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identical at $100, the obese and overweight set lower amounts for the former 
(overweight: $28 vs. $50; obese $0 vs. $10).  
A very similar pattern was observed with regard to the three income 
groups. The best-off and the middle group entered $200 for “carrot”, the low-
income group $150.  For “stick”, the high-income group converged around $100. 
The middle income group set $50, and the low-income group $20. For “false 
carrot”, low and middle income groups both opted for $50. The high-income 
group doubled this again, at $100. 
 
 
Median $ amounts and interquartile range (IQR) 
 Carrot False carrot Stick 
 Mdn IQR Mdn IQR Mdn IQR 
Weight       
Normal 200 100–500 100 0-250 100 0–250 
Overweight 150 50–300 50 0-200 28 0–175 
Obese 150 8–272 10 0-200 0 0–110 
Statistical significance 
 
H(2)=19.81, p<.0001 H(2)=20.28, p<.0001 H(2)=34.27, p<.0001 
Income       
High 200 100–500 100 0–500 100 0–400 
Middle 200 100–500 50 0–200 50 0–200 
Low  150 15-295 50 0–200 20 0–150 
Statistical significance H(2)=20.66, p<.0001 H(2)=10.80, p.0045 H(2)=12.72, p.0022 
 
Regarding the framing of penalties as “sticks” or “false carrots”, the best-off 
weight and income groups set identical amounts. This is plausible as the financial 
burden for not meeting the target is exactly the same. However, it is noteworthy 
that the lowest income group, the overweight, and the obese set lower levels for 
“stick” than for “carrot”. This may indicate that more overt penalising by singling 
out is less welcome among poorer and higher weight groups.   
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Limitations 
 
Although quota sampling enabled close approximation of census data in all 
relevant demographics, no other standardizations were performed. External 
validity is therefore limited, and the study does not permit inferences to the US 
population as a whole.  Respondents were asked to set acceptable levels in general 
terms: the set amounts are therefore likely to mix assumptions about fairness and 
effectiveness. For technical reasons, all levels entered were analyzed, and not only 
those for the first of the randomized scenarios (which would have reduced the 
impact of possible ordering effects).  In a preceding vignette, respondents rated 
the acceptability of a similar weight control scenario in which $150 was offered, 
with likely anchoring effects.  Further research, extending also to other relevant 
health domains, such as smoking, should therefore respond to these constraints to 
generate more robust data (in progress).   
 
Implications 
 
To my knowledge, this is the first empirical study to explore the acceptability of 
different ways of framing weight control incentives in a large-scale experimental 
setting.  “Carrots” were clearly preferred over “sticks”. In contrast to the 
preferences of advocates of increasing the legal limits of incentives, there was 
little support for large penalties in any of the strata. Opposition was strongest 
among low-income groups, the overweight, and the obese. The findings can 
suggest that where larger penalties are used, frustration and perhaps even 
pushback is possible. Care is required to ensure that employees do not perceive 
any form of incentive program merely as unfair cost-shifting, and reject the 
approach as a whole. Genuine employee engagement can help ascertain 
employees’ attitudes on levels and types of incentives early on in the planning 
process.  Explicit justification should be offered regarding program design and 
rationales, and the basis on which targets are deemed achievable for employees.2 
Wellness incentives are likely to be most effective when the interests of 
employees, employers and policy makers are aligned.  
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Summary Box:   
What is already known on this topic?  
Employers are increasingly using wellness incentives, including penalties for 
unhealthy behavior. Survey data suggests that people are willing to accept the 
principle of penalizing those perceived to take health risks, but the equally 
relevant question of the magnitude of acceptable penalties is unclear.  
 
What is added by this report? 
While the principle of penalizing overweight and obese people has some support, 
findings from a population-level experiment (n=1,000) suggest that the acceptable 
size of penalties is comparatively small, around $50: more than 10-fold below 
levels favored by advocates.  Reward-based incentives are favored over penalty-
based ones by a factor of 4.  Of two different ways of framing penalty programs, 
poorer and higher weight groups appear to find the one that is more overtly 
penalizing less acceptable. 
 
What are the implications for public health practice/policy/research?  
Levels of incentives matter on effectiveness as well as on ethical grounds, as it 
cannot be assumed that it is equally easy for all to meet health targets to secure a 
benefit or avoid a penalty. Programs should be designed to engage, not to frustrate 
those most in need of health improvement.  Employee involvement in determining 
incentive types and levels, and explicit justification for program design can help 
both employees and employers to reap benefits.  
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